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Philip N. Meyer with Catlin A. Davis
I. The Interpenetration of Law and Popular Culture: 20 Years Later
Over 20 years ago, I wrote about what I then labeled the “interpenetration”1 
of law and popular culture. I borrowed the term from Buddhism. It struck me 
then, as it does now, that the boundaries between legal storytelling practice 
and popular storytelling practice are permeable; legal storytelling practice is 
not autonomous. Although the aesthetics and conventions of legal storytelling, 
including courtroom litigation storytelling, are somewhat different and adhere 
to evidentiary rules and procedural constraints, legal storytelling is heavily 
influenced and affected by popular storytelling, and vice versa. As a result, 
the stories themselves inevitably bleed from one domain into the other: Legal 
stories influence entertainment and art, providing the subject matter for 
popular films, but simultaneously fictional literature, television programs, and 
commercial Hollywood movies reverse-engineer the structure and aesthetics 
of many stories told in the courtroom. Indeed, the narrative architecture 
and substance of many popular stories, especially plot-driven Hollywood 
entertainment movies (and, these days, perhaps long-form television serials as 
well) profoundly influence many of the stories now presented in the courtroom.
In some types of cases, the ways that evidence is presented in the courtroom 
and reconstructed in the jury room to fit verdict categories are intentionally 
shaped to fit narrative templates prefigured by popular cultural stories. Just 
as musicians typically borrow (and often steal without attribution) pieces of 
melodies and lyrics from other songsters, effective litigation attorneys often 
borrow shamelessly from popular culture (including movies, television, 
advertising, entertainment, journalism, and literature).
1. Philip N. Meyer, “Desperate for Love II”: Further Reflections on the Interpenetration of Legal Popular 
Storytelling in Closing Arguments to a Jury in a Complex Criminal Case, 30 U.S.F. L. Rev. 931, 931 (1996). 
Journal of Legal Education, Volume 68, Number 1 (Autumn 2018)
Philip N. Meyer is Professor of Law at Vermont Law School. Catlin A. Davis was a law student 
at Vermont Law School and is now a practicing attorney.
38 Journal of Legal Education
These “framing” stories often embody or emphasize shared cultural 
mythologies, notions of character, basic plot structures, and fundamental 
understandings of how our world works. Storytelling in the courtroom is 
sometimes shaped inside the shells of other framing stories, fitting together 
like nested Matryoshka Russian dolls.
Beginning, perhaps, in complex evidentiary and high-profile litigation 
of the second half of the twentieth century, excellent trial and appellate 
attorneys—including recognizable figures such as Gerry Spence suing Kerr-
McGee, Inc. for punitive damages on behalf of Karen Silkwood,2 or Johnny 
Cochrane defending O.J. Simpson3—drew intuitively and often intentionally 
on “popular” stories and cine-myths that could be readily understood, 
consumed, and digested by juries and judges.
New technologies employed creatively in the courtroom augmented this 
approach, sometimes making trials look and feel more like the movies, radio 
plays, and television programming. As techniques of presentation became 
more sophisticated, stories from outside the law have migrated back into the 
law—suggesting how evidence might be shaped and transformed into a story.
Years ago, scholarly acknowledgment of the interpenetration between legal 
and popular storytelling seemed transgressive. But now it seems apparent 
to many scholars, me included, that lawyers are, in large measure, popular 
storytellers—truthful and meticulous storytellers confined to aesthetic and rule-
bound conventions and constraints, but popular storytellers nevertheless—
who can learn from the techniques of other professional storytellers.
Initially, in several law review articles, I went on an anthropological dig 
into courtroom trials in Connecticut and into reviewing transcripts of famous 
trials and arguments—“deep dives” exploring the interpenetration of legal and 
popular storytelling practices.4
When I returned to the classroom, I incorporated storytelling practices and 
popular stories (especially movies) directly into my doctrinal pedagogy. My 
purpose, of course, was not to make my students into creative artists or film 
critics. Rather, my decision to incorporate popular movies was based upon 
my fundamental belief that it is important, initially, to provide courses that 
emphasize legal storytelling and the interaction of “law” and “facts.”
Simply put, law school, especially the doctrinal courses during the first year, 
tips the legally determinate and factually indeterminate world of most trial 
2. See Michael S. lief, h. Mitchell caldwell & Ben Bycel, ladieS and GentleMen of the 
JuRy: GReateSt cloSinG aRGuMentS in ModeRn law 119-58 (1998) (providing background 
on The Estate of Karen Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee, Inc. trial and Gerry Spence’s closing argument from 
the trial). 
3. See, e.g., Transcript of Record, People v. Simpson, No. BA097211 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County 
Jan. 25, 1995) (noting Johnny Cochran’s opening statement).
4. See generally Philip N. Meyer, “Desperate for Love”: Cinematic Influences Upon a Defendant’s Closing 
Argument to a Jury, 18 vt. l. Rev. 721 (1994); Meyer, “Desperate for Love II,” supra note 1; Philip N. 
Meyer, “Desperate for Love III”: Rethinking Closing Arguments as Stories, 50 S.c. l. Rev. 715 (1999).
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practitioners upside down. As Jerome Bruner suggested, litigation practice 
is in many ways a literary enterprise, not an analytical science5; Langdell got 
it wrong—lawyers are storytellers, and outcomes are often determined by 
effective and truthful storytelling based upon the meticulous introduction, 
presentation, and arrangement of complex factual evidence into stories.6
Consequently, as I wrote in this journal over twenty-five years ago,7 it is 
necessary to shatter the formalist doctrinal shell that encases first-year law 
students, and open students to an awareness of the complexity, singularity, 
and maddening indeterminacy of “facts” and how, in turn, facts are shaped 
into “stories.” To do so, I employ movie clips to teach doctrinal law and 
expose students to legal storytelling practice. I cast students into various 
legal roles, provide “the law” (statutes and cases), and then have the students 
apply the law to the oftentimes slippery, complex, and typically ambiguous 
facts depicted in the clip. Nothing, to my mind, better enables first-year law 
students to understand and appreciate the interactions between law and fact at 
the core of criminal law practice than this simple methodology.
In this essay, I explain how I use an illustrative visual hypothetical in my 
first-year criminal law course. I have enlisted the assistance of a third-year 
student, Catlin Davis, as commentator. Catlin was a student-consumer of this 
pedagogy in my criminal law class during her first year. I asked her to write a 
candid commentary about this representative cinematic hypothetical from the 
course.
II. “The Watery Grave” from George Stevens’ “A Place in the Sun”
I employ a complex and ambiguous story sequence from George Stevens’ 
masterful “A Place in the Sun”8 (based upon Theodore Dreiser’s novel, “An 
American Tragedy”9) as a review problem as we shift from studying the actus 
reus (a voluntary act that causes the social harm set forth in a criminal law 
statute) to the mens rea components of various crimes.
5. See generally JeRoMe BRuneR, MakinG StoRieS: law, liteRatuRe, life (2002) (exploring the 
fundamental, dynamic relationship between law and literature).
6. See Christopher Columbus Langdell, Harvard Celebration Speeches, 3 law Q. Rev. 118, 123-24 
(1887) (viewing law as a science composed of materials and principles that can be wholly 
contained in books).
7. See Philip N. Meyer, Convicts, Criminals, Prisoners, and Outlaws: A Course in Popular Storytelling, 42 
J. leGal educ. 129, 132 (1992) (“We watch and read stories to shatter the formalist shells in 
which law school tends to encase students, and thus to open the students up once again to 
the discontinuity and inexplicability of the lives they will encounter as lawyers.”).
8. a Place in the Sun (Paramount Pictures 1951). In class, I show a fifteen-minute clip from 
the movie that begins with George leaving a party at the Vickers’ summer home to meet 
his pregnant girlfriend Alice, and ends after Alice has drowned and George emerges from 
the lake. This excerpt is marked as “Scene 8 –Watery Grave” in the Scene Selections on the 
movie DVD”.
9. theodoRe dReiSeR, an aMeRican tRaGedy (1925).
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A. The Law
Before class, students review the California criminal homicide statutes 
(excerpted in Joshua Dressler’s criminal law casebook10). We discuss the 
elements of murder in California.11 Specifically, we analyze the definition of 
malice aforethought (express malice and implied malice); this is the mens rea 
element required for all levels of murder in California.12
I then cast students in the role of assistant prosecutors and assign them the 
task of determining whether George Eastman can be charged and successfully 
prosecuted for murder in California for the killing of his former girlfriend 
Alice.
B. The Evidence
Poor boy George Eastman (Montgomery Clift) has come West to work 
at his rich uncle’s factory. He is given a job on the factory line. He becomes 
romantically involved with Alice Tripp (Shelley Winters), a girl who works 
at the factory. She becomes pregnant; George is the father. George, however, 
soon falls in love with the boss’s beautiful daughter, Angela Vickers (Elizabeth 
Taylor). He visits with her at Loon Lake at the Vickers’ opulent summer home, 
and they declare their love for each other. Unexpectedly, Alice comes to the 
lake and demands that George marry her immediately or she will expose him 
(and her pregnant condition) to Angela and to the Vickers family. George 
agrees to marry her. But the marriage office is closed on Labor Day, and 
George takes Alice on a picnic trip to a deserted portion of Loon Lake.
Does George have a nefarious murder plan in mind? He stalls out the car 
some distance from the lake. (Is this to be the getaway car that cannot be 
identified?) He lies about his name to the boat rental agent. He takes Alice, 
who, he knows, does not swim and is profoundly fearful of water, out onto 
10. JoShua dReSSleR & StePhen P. GaRvey, cRiMinal law caSeS and MateRialS 256-58 (7th 
ed. 2016).
11. See id. (defining murder in California, and laying out the different elements and degrees of 
the crime).
12. Id. at 256-57. Under cal. Pen. code § 188 (West 2018), “Such malice may be express or 
implied.  It is express when there is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to take 
away the life of a fellow creature. It is implied, when . . . the circumstances attending the 
killing show an abandoned or malignant heart.”
41
the lake in a small rowboat. (She grabs for him fearfully as she steps into 
the boat.) The two then argue heading out onto the lake. George’s emotions 
apparently swing in different directions to the accompaniment of a dramatic 
musical underscore that, along with Clift’s acting abilities, strongly intimates 
the ambivalence of what George is feeling (e.g., his hatred for Alice at one 
moment, his sadness and remorse at another, and even his willingness to accept 
the moral consequences of his acts resulting in Alice’s pregnancy). George 
finally agrees to marry Alice. But Alice then declares that she knows George 
does not love her, and that he wishes she were dead. She stands up in the boat, 
and the boat tips over. George is next seen emerging from the water at a later 
time. He is alone. Alice has, apparently, drowned. 
Is this murder or merely a tragic accident? How do students “read” the 
facts of the visual story? How do students analyze the mens rea and actus reus 
elements of the crime of murder under the California penal statute and apply 
these elements of the crime to the complex and ambiguous facts depicted in 
the clip? What factual inferences can be plausibly made from the images and 
dialogue? 
C. The Legal Setup
Initially, I cast students into the role of assistant prosecutors. I ask whether 
George can be prosecuted for murder (first-degree murder, second-degree 
murder, or, perhaps, the lesser included crime of manslaughter) under the 
California Penal Code. What arguments would they make? What stories 
would they tell, based upon the facts depicted in the clip, to support their 
legal analysis?
Here is a partial inventory of the issues typically raised in class discussions 
as students attempt to fit together the interaction of law with the complex 
and ambiguous facts, constructing persuasive versions of the legal story based 
upon the evidence.
1. Mens rea: Does George have the mens rea of “malice aforethought” 
required to prosecute him for murder? How is “malice aforethought” defined 
in the statute? What “facts” indicate that he had malice? What are the facts 
that seem to show that he did not? How do you make inferences based upon 
the visual “cinematic” depictions of actions, and upon the characters’ spoken 
words (dialogue)? What stories (plots) would you tell (construct) based upon 
this evidence? If George, indeed, has malice aforethought, is it “implied” 
or “express” malice? What is the difference? How does this legal difference 
change the story told? Does it matter that he may have changed his mind and 
decided not to kill Alice at the moment she falls into the water? Does this 
change of heart extinguish or somehow mediate his liability? Can it even be 
argued based upon the evidence that he “premeditated” and “deliberated” 
the killing, and is therefore guilty of first-degree murder under the California 
Penal Code? How might this legal argument be made and what story would 
be told?
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2. Actus reus: Did George commit a voluntary act that caused the social harm 
(the killing of Alice)? If so, what specifically was this act (these acts)? When, 
specifically, did the act(s) occur? Is there a causal link between act(s) and 
outcome? How would prosecutors make the argument about concurrence 
between actus reus and mens rea? What, specifically, is the time frame of the 
crime? Is George guilty of attempted murder, and if so, when? Didn’t George, 
in the end, get precisely the result that he intended, even if events did not 
happen the way he planned? Why does this matter?
3. More questions about causation: Did Alice cause her own death? That 
is, were her own actions in the boat, which led it to tip over, the “proximate 
cause” of her death, rather than George’s actions (or inaction)? Can the 
defendant effectively make this argument (tell this story) based upon the acts 
depicted on the screen? What is the prosecutor’s counterargument?
4 Alternative theories: Can George be charged with manslaughter? Voluntary 
or involuntary? How many counts of murder/manslaughter can George 
be charged with under the California Penal Code? (That is, can he also be 
charged for the killing of the fetus?) Did George have a duty to rescue Alice 
based upon his special relationship with her?
5. Prosecutorial ethics: Although this exercise is intentionally focused on 
creative legal storytelling practice, and the interaction of law and facts, the 
class inevitably discusses the “ethics” of charging decisions based exclusively 
upon the “evidence” depicted in the clip, supplemented with the “back story” 
of events in the narrative preceding the clip. Is there sufficient evidence at 
this point to justify charging George with any crime? What further evidence 
needs to be developed through additional investigation to prove these 
charges beyond a reasonable doubt, confirming the narratives developed in 
the exercise? 
D. Telling the Story
I ask students acting as prosecutors to try telling specific portions of the 
story to a jury in a “mock” closing argument. What would their theme be? How 
would the plot be sequenced and constructed? I also ask: What additional 
evidence would you like to introduce at trial to support the prosecutor’s 
version of the story, and how would you employ this evidence in your closing 
argument? What counterstory do you anticipate that the defendant’s attorney 
will tell? What additional evidence do you anticipate that the defendant’s 
attorneys will introduce at trial supporting their version of the story? How 
would you respond to this evidence?
This exercise is effective as a simulation because of the complexity of 
“facts”— seemingly infinite and conflicting interpretations (inferences) may be 
made based upon the images depicted on the screen that can be shaped into 
compelling and truthful stories.
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III. Catlin Davis’s Commentary on “The Watery Grave”
“The Watery Grave” provides a deep reservoir of content for our assistant 
prosecutor roles. Its countless ambiguities affect many elements of the different 
homicide crimes. To successfully charge George for Alice’s death, we must 
craft the facts in a way that plausibly demonstrates each element of the crime 
in question. Moreover, to convict George, we must convince the jury of each 
element beyond a reasonable doubt. In other words, to fulfill our assistant 
prosecutor roles, we must transform the film’s ambiguous facts into a cohesive 
and persuasive story that the jury will find compelling. Arguing that George 
may have killed Alice will not be enough to convict him.
My classmates and I approached this exercise from diverse perspectives 
based on our intuitions, gut feelings, and understandings of an assistant 
prosecutor’s duty. Some people hoped to convict George of the most severe 
crime possible because they believed he was guilty, or because they thought it a 
prosecutor’s job to bring the harshest charges possible. Other students aspired 
to remain objective; they hoped to learn the true crime George committed. And 
still others believed in George’s innocence and wanted to avoid applying any 
of the statutes to his situation. 
Despite our knee-jerk responses, most of us evaluated George’s potential 
guilt in the same systematic fashion. We started with the most extreme homicide 
crime, first-degree murder, and explored the likelihood of proving all elements 
of this crime at trial. Can the facts be framed, organized, and revealed in a 
way that will convince the jury that George killed Alice willfully, deliberately, 
and with premeditation? After analyzing the likelihood of convicting George 
of first-degree murder, we moved to the second-most severe crime, second-
degree murder, and repeated the same analysis until we had analyzed George’s 
potential guilt under all of the California homicide crimes. In the end, most of 
us chose to charge George with the crimes supported by our best stories, the 
stories we found to be most true.
Some students, however, pushed themselves and chose to pursue a charge 
that required a more creative story, or a story that they knew would be harder to 
make the jury believe. These students wanted to test their persuasive powers. 
They wanted to see if they could push themselves to craft a narrative of the 
case that supported a first-degree murder charge, even if the story for second-
degree murder or voluntary manslaughter might be easier to tell. Despite 
my choice to pursue charges that fell within the narrative I found to be most 
“true,” or most reflective of George’s actual guilt, I am not opposed to my 
classmates’ alternative approach. Just because one story may be more unlikely, 
or more challenging to convince the jury to believe, does not necessarily mean 
that it is less true.
Class discussion flourished as we explained, debated, and tried to persuade 
our peers to appreciate our charges and narratives concerning George’s guilt. 
Based on the different facts students highlighted, George appeared callous 
and calculating one minute and then frightened and confused the next. People 
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heightened his culpability by highlighting his deceitful acts (stalling out the 
car and signing with a pseudonym when renting the boat), or they downplayed 
his guilt by highlighting his redeeming acts (George accepting his fate and 
resolving to marry Alice). Most of the discussion about which crime George 
should be charged with boiled down to our evaluation of George’s intent. 
We fought over the mens rea George possessed by basing our arguments on 
different inferences derived from the facts. 
As we continued crafting our complex stories of the case to adequately 
address the film clip’s different legal issues (questions of mens rea, actus 
reus, causation, etc.), many of us reflected on our adversarial court system. 
We returned to our initial knee-jerk reactions concerning the purpose of 
prosecuting George and our personal opinions regarding his potential guilt. 
We remained unsure whether we as assistant prosecutors were supposed to 
craft the most persuasive story for the strictest punishment possible, and let 
the defense tell the story of an innocent George, or if we were supposed to tell 
the true story of George’s guilt by charging him with the crime we found most 
objectively reasonable. I want more rules to guide the story crafting process 
so I will know I am telling an appropriate story that is fair to George, to the 
court, and to Alice.
Ultimately, the in-class exercise of charging George allowed us to use 
our creativity in class—an uncommon occurrence during the first year of law 
school. Significantly, the exercise also helped us realize the seriousness of 
crafting stories for our clients. With George, we were playing with fictional 
facts and with fictional people. Yet someday in the near future, many of us will 
find ourselves engaging in this same narrative crafting, but with real clients 
facing real punishments. 
IV. Conclusion
Numerous visual hypotheticals derived from popular movies can be 
employed to teach many of the various subject matters in the basic first-year 
criminal law course, emphasizing the complex interaction of law and fact 
and introducing students to the art of legal storytelling. These “clips” and 
storytelling exercises do not replace the traditional doctrinal coverage in 
the course, but serve as a complement to the cases. The visual hypotheticals 
and storytelling exercises make the classes come alive. And I cannot imagine 
teaching this course without them.
